The cyberstalking, an attack on human rights and freedom of expression

Abstract

This article examines whether cyberstalking —systematic harassment through digital means—

constitutes a violation of the human right to freedom of expression. It starts from the premise that, although it does not always imply a direct legal restriction, cyberharassment produces a chilling effect that limits participation in the public sphere and results in factual silencing, particularly affecting women, journalists, and human rights defenders. The research uses a dogmatic-legal and comparative approach, structured in four dimensions: a theoretical framework drawing on authors such as Alexy, Ferrajoli, Bobbio, Kelsen, and Sunstein; the analysis of national and international case law (SCJN, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and European Court of Human Rights) which defines the scope of freedom of expression and protection against indirect censorship; a review of recent statistics (INEGI, Article 19, UN Women) showing a growing incidence of ciberstalking, with differentiated impacts in Puebla; and an international comparison with Spain, Argentina, Chile, the United States, and the European Union, which highlights different regulatory models. The findings indicate that cyberstalking undermines both the individual and collective dimensions of freedom of expression. While criminal responses are relevant, they are not sufficient: comprehensive strategies are required that include prevention, digital education, cooperation with technological platforms, full reparation for victims, and judicial training. The central conclusion is that cyberstalking does violate freedom of expression as it generates self-censorship and weakens democratic debate, which requires guarantee-based and multi-level responses.